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Mill(er)ing Mandatory Minimums: What
Federal Lawmakers Should Take from
Miller v. Alabama
Mary Price*

I. INTRODUCTION
When the decision in Miller v. Alabama1 was announced, my colleagues
and I at Families Against Mandatory Minimums (FAMM) cheered its ringing
endorsement of proportionality and individualized sentencing. FAMM, after
all, was formed in 1991 to champion sentencing discretion and work to eliminate laws and policies that require judges to impose pre-set minimum sentences. In its earliest days, FAMM found its unique voice by gathering, distilling, and telling the stories of individuals who received disproportionate
sentences because of mandatory sentencing laws. Part of our job to this day,
more than twenty-two years later, remains to tell anyone who will listen, and
especially lawmakers, that a defendant facing sentencing deserves to be seen
as more than the crime for which he or she was convicted. An essential part
of our work is giving a voice to people who were, for all intents and purposes,
silenced at sentencing.
In this Article, I make the case that, while the robust proportionality
principles informing Miller and similar cases are unlikely to translate into the
end of mandatory minimum sentencing by way of the Eighth Amendment (at
least anytime soon), embracing sentencing proportionality is the key for lawmakers who are – or should be – addressing the unsustainable growth in the
federal prison population as a distinct threat to public safety. Politicians who
support mandatory minimums have been immune over the years to the many
reasoned arguments about how unjust those sentences are and what costs they
pose to families and communities. Mandatory minimum sentences have been
touted as necessary to keep the public safe, and support for these sentences
has been seen as politically expedient. Even empirical arguments demonstrating that getting rid of mandatory sentencing will not harm public safety
have fallen on deaf ears. We grew a criminal justice system addicted to solving social and public safety problems with incarceration and we combined
that system with a long-simmering distrust of the judiciary, thereby creating
mandatory minimums that dominate the sentencing field, directly and indirectly, through their sentencing guideline proxies.

* Mary Price is the General Counsel of Families Against Mandatory Minimums
(FAMM).
1. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
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However, today federal lawmakers face a new challenge: the burgeoning
prison population consumes an ever-growing portion of the budget of the
Department of Justice (DOJ).2 This threatens the budgets for the DOJ’s other
components, including those directly responsible for public safety, such as the
FBI, and those that fund grants to state and local law enforcement. A number
of states – including conservative states – for which the problem of overincarceration surfaced with greater urgency over the last seven years initiated
measures to stabilize their prison populations, if not reduce them.3 Those
states were laboratories for change and caught the attention of traditional
supporters of harsh sentencing policies: conservative lawmakers and opinion
leaders who are speaking out about mass incarceration, the influence of sentencing, and even mandatory minimums. Some of these conservative politicians and opinion leaders even made common cause with their liberal counterparts to take a look at over-criminalization, over-federalization, and even
early release mechanisms.
In this Article, I draw a connection between mandatory minimum sentencing and the growth of the federal prison population; mandatory minimums have required and influenced unduly lengthy sentences that are neither
individualized nor proportionate. Proportionate sentencing, on the other
hand, results in lower sentences, not to mention bed and cost savings. While
“back-end” reforms to encourage the earlier release of prisoners are commendable, front-end reforms that result in lower sentences are essential if we
are to make a lasting impact on the size of the federal prison population.
Sentencing policies that embrace proportionality are key to stabilizing and
reducing overcrowding. Of course, proportionality as an end in itself is ideal,
but those of us who advocate for change may have to settle for selling sentencing proportionality as an indispensable means to a necessary end.

II. MANDATORY MINIMUMS AND FEDERAL SENTENCING
Mandatory minimum sentencing is the antithesis of individualized sentencing. In its purest form, a mandatory minimum is set by legislators and
triggered by a conviction for a qualifying crime, by the crime’s “offense
characteristics,” or by reference to an underlying or prior offense.4 In crimi2. See JULIE SAMUELS, ET AL., URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR., STEMMING
THE TIDE: STRATEGIES TO REDUCE THE GROWTH AND CUT THE COST OF THE FEDERAL
PRISON SYSTEM 2 (Nov. 2013), available at http://www.urban.org/Uploaded

PDF/412932-stemming-the-tide.pdf
3. Ron French, Shifting Prison Politics: How GOP Is Getting Smarter on
Crime, BRIDGE MAG. (Feb. 14, 2012), http://bridgemi.com/2012/02/politics-ofprisons-shifting/; see also The Pew Charitable Trusts, States Cut Both Crime and
Imprisonment (Dec. 2013), http://www.pewstates.org/research/data-visualizations/
states-cut-both-crime-and-imprisonment-85899528171.
4. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY
MINIMUMS IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 4 (Oct. 2011) [hereinafter
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nal justice systems with determinate sentencing – which elevates certainty
about the length of imprisonment over other considerations – the term is unrelieved by parole. There is also no so-called “second look” opportunity for
courts to consider whether an imposed mandatory minimum sentence continues to serve the ends of justice following its imposition and the passage of
time.5 This commitment to finality is enshrined in 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c),
which provides only a handful of opportunities – none of which are available
to the court in the first instance6 – to revisit a sentence once it is finalized.
The federal government’s latest grand experiment with mandatory minimums7 began in the mid-1980s and was prompted in part by a repudiation of
the rehabilitative model of sentencing and the elevation of a model designed
to ensure more certainty, fewer differences among and between sentences,
and, in the words of the U.S. Sentencing Commission (Commission), “more
appropriately punitive” sentences.8 The mandatory minimums adopted (for
drug offenses)9 or increased (for gun offenses)10 during this period were gen2011 MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT], available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_
and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/Mandatory_Minimum_P
enalties/20111031_RtC_Mandatory_Minimum.cfm.
5. The purposes of punishment are set out at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2006),
and can be roughly summarized as just punishment, deterrence, incapacitation
and rehabilitation.
6. The court may reduce an imposed sentence to grant “compassionate release”
from prison for “extraordinary and compelling circumstances,” but only upon motion
by the Bureau of Prisons under 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(1)(A)(i) (2006); reduce a sentence
for substantial cooperation in the investigation or prosecution of others but only on
motion by the government, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B) (2006), 18 U.S.C. §
3553(e) (2006), and FED. R. CRIM. P. 35; or reduce a sentence imposed under the
federal Sentencing Guidelines, but only if the applicable sentencing guideline has
subsequently been lowered by the U.S. Sentencing Commission and that lower sentence deemed “retroactive” by the Commission, under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006)
and U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.10 (2012).
7. For a discussion of the history of mandatory minimums, see 2011
MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 4, at 7-34. See also MOLLY M. GILL,
FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, CORRECTING COURSE: LESSONS FROM
THE 1970 REPEAL OF MANDATORY MINIMUMS 7-17, available at http://www.
famm.org/Repository/Files/8189_FAMM_BoggsAct_final.pdf.
8. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS,
MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 7
(1991) [hereinafter 1991 MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT], available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/digitization/137910NCJRS.pdf.
9. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat.
3207 (1986).
10. For example, in 1984, Congress increased the one-year mandatory minimum
for using or carrying a firearm while committing a felony adopted in 1970 to five
years when used in connection with a crime of violence, Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-473, § 1005(a), 98 Stat. 1837, 2138-39 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c)), and
amended it again in 1986 to enhance firearm mandatory minimums when associated
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erated around drug-based street wars of the 1980s and remain, with two notable exceptions,11 on the books and in the toolboxes of prosecutors to this day.
Mandatory minimums have continued to grow over the years, both in number
and in length; they now number more than 190.12
Judges are constrained to impose the mandatory minimum sentence
when certain triggering conditions, such as drug type and quantity13 or the use
of a gun,14 are met and, unless federal law has carved out an exception,15 may
not impose a lower sentence. Such a rigidly-structured system is inhospitable
ground for considerations of proportionality – the notion that a punishment
should fit the crime – and individualization, the notion that the punishment
should fit the offender. Congress knew full well how to fashion a system that
accounted for such things. We know that because, remarkably, just two years
before Congress adopted the modern-era mandatory minimums, it passed the
Sentencing Reform Act (SRA).16 The SRA was a criminal justice system
game changer; it abolished parole, ushered in determinate sentencing, and
ended an era of uncabined judicial discretion.17 It directed the creation of the
Commission and charged it with promulgating sentencing guidelines.18
However, the SRA also produced the federal statute governing sentencing that establishes a roadmap for proportionate, individualized sentencing. Courts are directed by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to undertake a series of
considerations in determining the appropriate sentence for an offender,
including evaluating individual features of the crime and characteristics of the
offender. These considerations include the nature and seriousness of the offense, history and characteristics of the defendant, the sentences available
under the law, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparity among
with drug trafficking offenses. Act of May 19, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 104, 100
Stat. 449, 456-45 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 924).
11. In 1994, Congress adopted the Safety Valve, permitting courts to waive
mandatory minimum sentences for certain drug defendants who met a set of narrow
criteria, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2006), and in 2010, following years of criticism and
efforts to eliminate the sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372
(amending 21 U.S.C. 841 (b)(1) (2006)), raising the amount of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the five- and ten-year mandatory minimum sentences.
12. See 2011 MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 4, at tbl.A-1. The drug
and gun mandatory minimums, while not the only ones, are however the ones most
frequently invoked. Id. at 73 fig.4-6.
13. See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (Supp. 2011).
14. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
15. See supra note 11; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2006) (providing a
waiver on the government’s motion if the defendant has provided substantial assistance to the government).
16. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2, 98
Stat. 1987.
17. See id.
18. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1).
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similarly situated defendants.19 The statute mandates that the sentence imposed at the end of that structured inquiry be “sufficient but not greater than
necessary”20 to comply with the purposes of punishment: just punishment,
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. In other words, the sentence
must be proportionate.
Sadly, the promise of proportionality and parsimony was undermined by
lawmakers suspicious of judges and judicial discretion – prompting Professor
Kate Stith and Judge José Cabranes to name their history of the period Fear
of Judging.21 An amendment to the SRA, codified at § 3553(b), was interpreted22 to ensure that the guidelines would be – for all intents and purposes –
mandatory, barring an unusual factor not accounted for in the drafting of the
guideline sufficient to warrant a “departure.”23 The tantalizing promise of
proportionate sentences arrived at by weighing individual characteristics to
determine culpability and features of the offense was abandoned in favor of a
complex set of guidelines, many of which were in turn indexed to statutory
mandatory minimums.24

III. HOPE FROM THE COURT?
A. Sixth Amendment Challenges
Individualized sentencing, proportionality, and parsimony were essentially stillborn and remained unused for the most part until the Supreme
Court’s decision in United States v. Booker over twenty years after the enactment of the SRA. Relying on the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a jury
trial, a 5-4 majority in Booker held that the sentencing guidelines were unconstitutional to the extent that they required judges to increase sentences
above the top of a guideline range using facts not pled by the prosecution,
admitted by the defendant, or proven beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury.25
However, the guidelines were salvaged – albeit as advice rather than as
mandate – by a slightly different 5-4 majority, which excised two provisions
in federal law: the aforementioned § 3553(b) and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e), which
appellate courts used to ensure that district court judges did not stray far from
19. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
20. Id. This parsimony mandate was secured by the prescient intervention of

Sen. Charles Mathias (D-MD). See 130 CONG. REC. 29,870 (1984); see also John
Conyers Jr., Unresolved Issues in the Federal Sentencing Reform Act, 32 FED. B.
NEWS & J. 68, 69 (1985) (attributing parsimony mandate to Sen. Mathias).
21. KATE STITH & JOSÉ CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING 177 (1998).
22. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). For a comprehensive review of the evolution of the
guidelines into their all but mandatory state, see Amy Baron-Evans & Kate Stith,
Booker Rules, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1631, 1641-57 (2012).
23. See § 3553(b).
24. See infra Part V.B.
25. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005).
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the sentencing guidelines.26 Doing so effectively transformed mandatory
guidelines into advisory guidelines. The guideline structure and instructions
remained essentially intact, save for their power over sentencing, which was
altered to elevate judicial discretion. Subsequent decisions reinforced Booker
and strengthened judicial discretion in sentencing.27 The decision and its
progeny breathed new life into the promise of proportionality in § 3553(a).
Consequently, there are two systems of determining punishment that exist in tension. One – defined by criminal statutes that provide for mandatory
minimums – permits no individualization and accordingly often results in
disproportionate sentences.28 The other, which is defined by statutes that do
not require mandatory minimums, requires an individualized inquiry. Where
the law provides for a mandatory minimum sentence, the judge must impose
it unless the defendant provided substantial assistance or is eligible for a
waiver under the federal safety valve.29 In cases where no mandatory minimum is implicated, the judge may impose the calculated guideline sentence or
she may vary from the guideline sentence if it fails to survive the 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a) inquiry.
Booker’s outcome and the transformation from mandatory to advisory
guideline sentencing depended not on the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel
and unusual punishment but on the right to jury trial embodied in the Sixth
Amendment.30 While Booker elevated judicial discretion and individualized
sentencing under the guidelines, those outcomes are only byproducts of the
Court’s principal mission: to secure the Sixth Amendment right to a jury.
The Court was not principally concerned with proportionality or even individualization in Booker and its progeny.
The Sixth Amendment line of cases did recently reach a subset of mandatory minimums, altering how some are achieved. In Alleyne v. United
States, decided in June 2013, the Supreme Court held that, because mandatory minimums increase the penalty for the crime, any fact that increases a
mandatory minimum is an offense element and must be submitted to the jury
and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.31 The decision was a straightforward,
but hard-fought extension of the so-called Apprendi rule. The Apprendi rule
commands that any fact that increases the range of punishment to which a
defendant is exposed is an element of the crime and must be presented to the

26. Id. at 245.
27. See, e.g., Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007); see also Spears v. United

States, 555 U.S. 261 (2009).
28. The problems of mandatory minimums are documented at length. See generally 1991 MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 8; 2011 MANDATORY
MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 4; Stories, FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS,
http://famm.org/stories/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2013).
29. For a fuller discussion of the safety valve, see infra Part VI.
30. Booker, 543 U.S. at 267-68.
31. 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155 (2013).
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jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.32 Until Alleyne, the Court had
exempted mandatory minimums from the Apprendi rule.33
Sixth Amendment-based sentencing reforms have not extended to jury
sentencing. While juries have a key role in finding the facts and assessing
guilt, they have no direct role in sentencing and judges do not inform them of
the sentencing implications of conviction; however, some federal judges have
tested the waters of jury sentencing when faced with what they considered
excessive mandatory minimums. In one famous example, Judge Jack Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York dismissed the jury’s conviction of a
man found to have received child pornography because the jury was not advised of the five-year sentence the conviction carried.34 Judge Weinstein
polled the jurors following the verdict and found that knowledge of the mandatory minimum would have changed some votes for conviction.35 The ruling was overturned on appeal.36 Judge Paul Cassell of the District of Utah,
facing sentencing Weldon Angelos to a fifty-five year mandatory minimum
sentence for possessing a gun on three occasions while selling small amounts
of marijuana, polled the jurors before imposing a sentence.37 He provided
them with information about Angelos’ limited criminal history, told them that
there was no parole in the federal system, and asked them what would be the
appropriate sentence.38 None recommended a sentence anywhere near the
fifty-five years Judge Cassell was forced to impose.39 Judge James S. Gwin
of the Northern District of Ohio enlisted other Midwest judges in an experiment, in which they surveyed jurors following twenty-two trials, asking what
sentence the jurors would impose.40 The suggested sentences were markedly
different from those required by the Sentencing Guidelines and were also
below the sentences that were enhanced by mandatory minimums.41
32. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
33. See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002) (holding that jury fact-

finding is not necessary when a fact is used to enhance a mandatory minimum within
the range of punishment otherwise authorized by the jury), overruled by Alleyne, 133
S. Ct. 2151.
34. United States v. Polizzi, 549 F. Supp. 2d 308 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), vacated and
remanded sub nom.; see also United States v. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 2009).
35. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d. at 146; see also Colin Moynihan, Judge Defies Prosecutors on Pornography Sentence, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2011, at A24, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/14/nyregion/14weinstein.html?_r=0.
36. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d. 142.
37. United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1230, 1242 (D. Utah 2004).
38. Id. at 1242.
39. Id. The jury’s mean recommended sentence was eighteen years; the median
was fifteen years. Id.
40. James S. Gwin, Juror Sentiment on Just Punishment: Do the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Reflect Community Values?, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 173,
174 (2010).
41. Id. at 188-89 (noting that the average juror recommended sentence was sixtyfive months, while the average guideline minimum sentence was 138 months); see
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Despite these forays into jury involvement in mandatory sentencing,
there is little appetite to involve juries in deciding prison terms. Whatever
potential the Sixth Amendment held for mandatory minimum reform appears
to have been realized, at least for the time being.

B. Eighth Amendment Challenges
The Eighth Amendment is similarly limited, at least vis-à-vis mandatory
sentencing overall. The decisions in Miller v. Alabama and Graham v. Florida before it are solidly grounded in the Eighth Amendment’s ban on
disproportionately severe punishment, and seemingly offering some hope that
mandatory minimums may be assailable as failing to provide for mitigation to
check unduly harsh sentences. Graham tantalizingly discusses culpability,
not merely in light of the crime but also with respect to the defendant’s characteristics.42 Miller endorses the concept that punishment “should be
graduated to both the offender and the offense.”43 In contrast, mandatory
minimums rely most heavily on the crime and one or two facts about it, such
as drug quantity, and only consider offender characteristics, such as criminal
history, in aggravation.44 And while a sentence may be appropriately severe
in some cases, mandatory minimums ensure that they are applied in all cases,
including those where the punishment will be disproportionately severe.45
But, while the Eighth Amendment recognizes the right to be secure from
excessive sanctions – a right that flows from the principle that punishment be
“graduated and proportionate” to both the crime and the offender – it has not
been interpreted to bar mandatory minimum penalties outright.46 That said,
also id. at 196-200 tbl.3 (comparing guideline and statutory sentences with those
settled on by jurors).
42. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010).
43. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct 2455, 2463 (2012) (quoting Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
44. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2006) (doubling 10 year mandatory
minimum to 20 years for second offense); 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C)(i) (2006) (providing for 25-year mandatory minimum for defendant’s second or successive use of a
gun in connection with a drug trafficking or crime of violence).
45. As Professor O’Hear points out, Miller evinces distrust, not of LWOP per se
but of mandatory minimum sentences: “LWOP for juvenile killers . . . [would be]
categorically acceptable[ if] imposed on a discretionary basis [has become] unconstitutional solely where it is mandatory.” Michael M O’Hear, Not Just Kids Stuff?, 78
MO. L. REV. 1087 (2013).
46. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-95 (1991) (holding that a
mandatory minimum sentence of life without parole for a drug offense involving 650
grams or more of cocaine or heroin by a first time offender does not violate the Eighth
Amendment, because, while such a sentence may be cruel, it is not unusual and is not
unconstitutional simply due to the fact that it is mandatory); see also Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 18, 30-31 (2003) (finding sentence of twenty-five years to life for
stealing a set of golf clubs, when defendant had four prior convictions, did not violate
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the Court has slowly carved proportionality into otherwise rigid legislative
formulations in death penalty and certain juvenile cases. Those opinions
contain provocative references that, absent the categorical limitations, would
appear to embrace the concept that mandatory sentencing is constitutionally
flawed because it prohibits the defendant from offering evidence in mitigation
of sentence.
For example, in Woodson v. North Carolina, which struck down mandatory death for first-degree murder, the Court wrote that the statute offended
the Constitution because:
[The statute] accords no significance to relevant facets of the character
and record of the individual offender or the circumstances [of the
crime, and] exclude[ed] from consideration . . . the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of
humankind. It treats all persons convicted of a designated offense not
as uniquely individual human beings, but as members of a faceless,
undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death.47

Miller catalogues a robust list of considerations that mandatory schemes, like
the mandatory life without parole sentence, prohibit:
Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes consideration
of his chronological age and its hallmark features – among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences. It prevents taking into account the family and home environment
that surrounds him . . . no matter how brutal or dysfunctional. It neglects the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent
of his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him . . . . [T]his mandatory punishment disregards the possibility of rehabilitation even when the circumstances
most suggest it.”48

The spirit animating Woodson and Miller echoes § 3553(a) inquiries
into circumstances of the offense and offender. The force of Justice Sonia
Sotomayor’s endorsement of individualization and proportionality notwithstanding, and whether (or to what extent) the Court is willing to extend or
shade the lines drawn in the death and juvenile cases in a way that
undermines mandatory schemes for other groups of individuals and for other
outcomes, the end of mandatory sentencing – assuming Ewing and Harmelin
the Eighth Amendment); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 66, 77 (2003) (affirming
fifty-years to life sentence for stealing videotapes by a defendant with three
prior convictions).
47. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
48. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468.
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hold – is likely not found in the courts.49 As has been pointed out repeatedly by the Court, establishing the limits of sentencing is first a matter
of legislative prerogative; absent a finding that the system violates the Constitution, it could be a long slog. Thus, “significant reform will come, if at all,
by Congress.”50
With a couple of notable exceptions, the harms caused by mandatory
minimums, the injustices they impose, and their failure to achieve the outcomes they were adopted to meet have not swayed lawmakers enough to take
the steps necessary to end or ameliorate mandatory sentencing or to embrace
proportionality as described by Justice Sotomayor. Proportionality qua proportionality, even if a value in the abstract, is not a value shared by most federal lawmakers considering sentencing and mandatory minimums. And the
ode to proportionality and individualized sentencing that is the Miller decision is unlikely to move federal lawmakers to go “soft on crime.”
And yet, the need for proportionality in sentencing has never been
greater. I believe the key to elevating proportionality to a value lawmakers
will embrace will be found in one of the chief harms caused by the rise of
mandatory minimums: the explosive growth of the federal prison population
and the pressure it exerts on the DOJ’s budget.

IV. GROWTH OF THE FEDERAL PRISON POPULATION51
One of the byproducts of mandatory minimum sentencing is the tremendous prison growth that has occurred during the last twenty-five years.52
While budgets were expanding and money for prisons was not an issue, so
49. See, e.g., O’Hear, supra note 45 (discussing how Harmelin, Ewing, Graham
and Miller do not provide a comprehensive principle but notes how the juvenile cases
“may provide a basis for relief for various specific categories of adult” LWOP offenders); see also Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1, 28-29 (2010) (“In reality . . . the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in this
area, described by some as an abandonment of the field, makes clear that judicial
review will not provide much of a check on excessive punishment.”).
50. Luna & Cassell, supra note 49, at 29.
51. In Parts IV, V and VI of this Article, I build on ideas I have presented elsewhere in other forms. Letter in Response to a Request for Pub. Comment from Julie
Stewart, President & Mary Price, Vice President, Families Against Mandatory
Minimums, to Judge Patti B. Saris 2 (July 15, 2013) [hereinafter Request for
Public Comment],
available at
http://famm.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/
07/FAMM-commission-comments-DR.pdf. In doing so, I have periodically adopted
or closely paraphrased statements I have made before. In an effort to avoid burdening
the text with unnecessary quotation marks, I have included footnotes noting where
these similarities arise and also included references to the original source material for
these propositions.
52. NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42937, THE FEDERAL PRISON
POPULATION BUILDUP: OVERVIEW, POLICY CHANGES, ISSUES, AND OPTIONS (2013)
[hereinafter CRS Report], available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42937.pdf.
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called “tough on crime” lawmakers found it expedient to pass criminal statutes with mandatory minimums. While some of these politicians genuinely
believed that rigid sentences would deter criminals and keep our communities
safer, it became too easy to score political points by seizing on the crime du
jour to support adopting a new mandatory minimum. Mandatory minimums
were “frequently the result of floor amendments to demonstrate emphatically
that legislators want to ‘get tough on crime.’”53 Other lawmakers describe a
more principled, but evidence-light, process. For example, former Representative Dan Lungren, a republican from California, recently reflected on the
dramatic escalation of the crack cocaine mandatory minimum by the House
of Representatives in 1986: “We initially came out of committee with a 20-to1 ratio. By the time we finished on the floor, it was 100-to-1. We didn't really have an evidentiary basis for it, but that's what we did, thinking we were
doing the right thing at the time.”54
While experts may disagree about whether mandatory minimums made
us safer,55 they have created other pressures that threaten public safety.
Today, the costs of such policies are keenly felt as the need to maintain and
increase prison spending eats into other budgets, including those allocated
for law enforcement. The DOJ, long a proponent of mandatory sentencing, began to sound the alarm several years ago. In speeches and submissions to Congress and the Commission, the DOJ and its representatives
highlighted the increasing share of the Department’s budget dedicated to
funding federal prisons.56
The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) is currently operating at 36%
above rated capacity.57 The Inspector General of the DOJ (IG) bluntly rates
53. Luna & Cassell, supra note 49, at 24 (quoting William H. Rehnquist, Luncheon Address (June 18, 1993), in U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, DRUGS AND VIOLENCE IN
AMERICA 287 (1993)).
54. Congressional Record, 111th Cong. H 6202 (July 28, 2010), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?r111:7:./temp/~r111M9LunZ:e60208.
55. See infra text accompanying notes 71-72.
56. Request for Public Comment, supra note 51; see also id. at 2 n.2 (quoting
Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Address at the National
District Attorney’s Association Summer Conference (July 23, 2012), available at
http://www.justice. gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2012/crm-speech-120723.html (“[W]e
must also recognize that a criminal justice system that spends disproportionately on
prisons – at the expense of policing, prosecutions and recidivism-reducing programs –
is unlikely to be maximizing public safety.”); see also Michael E. Horowitz, Inspector
General, Top Management and Performance Challenges Facing the Department of
Justice – 2013, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Dec. 11, 2013, reissued Dec. 23, 2013) (citing the
opinion of the Deputy Attorney General that the increasing cost of the prison system
is “unsustainable.”), available at http://www.justice.gov/ oig/challenges/2013.htm#l.
57. Request for Public Comment, supra note 51 at 2 (citing Federal Bureau of
Prisons FY 2014 Budget Request: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce,
Justice, Sci. & Related Agencies of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 113th Cong.
4 (April 17, 2013) [hereinafter Samuels Statement] (statement of Charles E.
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its outlook as “bleak: the BOP projects system-wide crowding to exceed 44%
over rated capacity through 2018.”58 This problem has been long in the making. The number of federal prisoners has grown from roughly 25,000 in FY
1980 to nearly 219,000 in FY 2012.59 Between FY 2000 and FY 2012, the
annual per capita cost to incarcerate federal prisoners increased from $21,603
to $29,207.60 The BOP’s budget grew accordingly, from $3.668 billion to
$6.641 billion.61
According to the IG, the budget pressures created by the bloated prison
population are significant and can be traced in part to the increased numbers
of prisoners entering the system:
[T]he Department faces the challenge of addressing the growing cost
of housing a continually growing and aging population of federal inmates and detainees. The federal prison system is consuming an everlarger portion of the Department’s budget, making safe and secure incarceration increasingly difficult to provide, and threatening to force
significant budgetary and programmatic cuts to other DOJ components
in the near future. In FY 2006, there were 192,584 inmates in BOP
custody. As of October 2012, the BOP reported 218,730 inmates in
BOP custody, an increase of more than 13 percent. Not surprisingly,
these trends mirror the increased number of federal defendants sentenced each year, which rose from approximately 60,000 in FY 2001
to more than 86,000 in FY 2011, according to the U.S. Sentencing
Commission.62

The IG anticipates that, absent a course change, the BOP’s 25% share of the
FY 2013 DOJ budget will grow to 28% by 2018.63
Notwithstanding these funding increases, overcrowding in the BOP continues and threatens the safety of prisoners and prison staff alike. The current

Samuels, Jr., Dir. of the Fed. Bureau of Prisons), available at http://appropriations.
house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-113-ap19-wstate-samuelsc-20130417.pdf (describing a
capacity of 129,000 and a prison population of 176,000, which results in a capacity
at 136%, and describing how medium security prisons operate at 44% above capacity
and high security prisons operate at 54% above capacity).
58. Horowitz, supra note 56.
59. CRS Report, supra note 52.
60. Id. at 15 tbl.1.
61. Id. at 12 fig.5.
62. Request for Public Comment, supra note 51, at 2-3 (quoting Oversight of the
Department of Justice: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice, Sci. and
Related Agencies of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 113th Cong. 9 (March 14,
2013) [hereinafter Horowitz March Statement] (statement of Michael E. Horowitz,
Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice), available at: http://appropriations.
house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-113-ap19-wstate-horowitzm-20130314.pdf).
63. Horowitz, supra note 56.
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inmate-to-staff ratio is five-to-one,64 and BOP Director Charles Samuels recently testified about the dangers this situation poses.65 So critical is the need
for staff and the concern about the impact of across-the-board automatic
spending cuts, that the Attorney General asked Congress to permit the DOJ
authority to reprogram funds from other DOJ components to the BOP.66 The
request was approved and the DOJ reprogrammed $150 million to the BOP,67
including approximately $90 million from the FBI.68
However, reprogramming is unsustainable. The IG warned Congress in
early June 2013 that “continuing to spend more money each year to operate
more federal prisons will require the Department to make cuts to other important areas of its operations.”69 The Urban Institute reported its assessment
that “[i]n these fiscally lean times, funding the expanding BOP population
crowds out other priorities, including federal investigators and prosecutors
and support for state and local governments.”70 In other words, locking up
criminals at current rates and sentences is threatening public safety.
Conservatives, formerly supportive of mandatory sentencing and incarceration policies, have also begun to sound the alarm. Reflecting on his own prior
assessment that “the social benefits approximately equaled the costs of incarceration,” influential economist Steven D. Levitt told the New York Times in
December 2012, “I think we should be shrinking the prison population by at
least one-third.”71 David Keene, past president of the National Rifle Association, reflected in an op-ed supporting mandatory minimum reform that
“spending too much on prisons skews state and federal budgetary priorities,
64. Horowitz March Statement, supra note 62, at 9.
65. Samuels Statement, supra note 57, at 4-5 (“[I]ncreases in both the inmate-to-

staff ratio and the rate of crowding at an institution (the number of inmates relative to
the institution’s rated capacity) are related to increases in the rate of serious inmate
assaults. An increase of one in an institution’s inmate-to-custody-staff ratio increases
the prison’s annual serious assault rate by approximately 4.5 per 5,000 inmates.”).
66. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice, Science and Related
Agencies of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 113th Con. 1 (June 6, 2013) (Statement
of Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen. of the U.S.), available at http://www. appropriations.senate.gov/ht-commerce.cfm?method=hearings.download&id=5c7116e8-9d3b4e21-9b2d-86b157adb140.
67. Id.
68. Federal Bureau of Prisons FY 2014 Budget Request: Hearing Before
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on
Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies, Transcript of Testimony of
Charles E. Samuels, Jr., Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons 6 (April 17, 2013)
(on file with author).
69. Request for Public Comment, supra note 51, at 3 (quoting Horowitz June
Statement, supra note 63, at 10).
70. SAMUELS, ET AL, supra note 2, at 14.
71. John Tierney, For Lesser Crimes, Rethinking Life Behind Bars, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 12, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/12/science/mandatory-prison-sentences-face-growing-skepticism.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
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taking funds away from things that are proven to drive crime even lower,
such as increasing police presence in high-violence areas and providing drug
treatment to addicts.”72

V. THE ROLE OF MANDATORY MINIMUMS IN THE FEDERAL PRISON
OVERCROWDING CRISIS
The lengthening of prison sentences, spurred particularly by mandatory
minimums, directly contributes to the increase in the federal prison population. A recent report by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) places the
blame for prison overcrowding and the budget crisis squarely on decisions by
Congress and the Commission.73 The report identified four factors driving
over-incarceration: (1) increased numbers of federal offenses subject to mandatory minimums; (2) the growth in mandatory minimums, which has in turn
led to increased sentencing ranges and lengths under the federal Sentencing
Guidelines; (3) the growing number of federal offenses; and (4) the elimination of parole.74
Similarly, the Urban Institute, in its recent study of the causes of overpopulation in the BOP, concluded that policies affecting the front end of the
sentencing process have had the greatest impact:
More than 90 percent of BOP inmates are sentenced offenders, mostly
for federal crimes. The number and composition of offenders committed to federal prison result from the investigations pursued by law enforcement, cases accepted and charged by prosecutors, the dispositions
of those cases, the proportion of convicted offenders that receive a
term of imprisonment, and the imposed sentence . . . . It is the combination of the volume of admissions and sentence that drives the inmate
population. The length of stay is largely determined by the sentence
imposed (informed by the relevant statutory penalties and federal sentencing guidelines), and any subsequent sentence reductions that release inmates early. Currently, few options for early release exist, and
most federal offenders sentenced to prison serve at least 87.5 percent
of their term of imprisonment . . . .75

Mandatory minimums have played an important role in overall federal
sentence length in three ways. First, mandatory minimums are lengthy
and have grown over the years.76 Second, sentencing guidelines for crimes
72. David Keene, Prison-Sentence Reform, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (May 24, 2013,
4:00 AM), available at http://www.nationalreview.com/article/349118/prisonsentence-reform-david-keene.
73. See CRS Report, supra note 52.
74. Id. at 7.
75. SAMUELS ET AL., supra note 2, at 9-10.
76. CRS Report, supra note 52, at 8.
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that carry mandatory minimums anchor sentence ranges to the minimums,
and guideline ranges increase according to sentencing factors set out in
the guidelines.77 Third, even for crimes for which there are no mandatory
minimums, the longer sentences made necessary by such minimums
nonetheless exert a gravitational pull, lifting up all guideline ranges in a parody of proportionality.78

A. Long and Longer Mandatory Minimums
According to the CRS Report,
Mandatory minimum penalties have contributed to federal prison population growth because they have increased in number, have been applied to more offenses, required longer terms of imprisonment, and are
used more frequently than they were 20 years ago. . . . Not only has
there been an increase in the number of federal offenses that carry a
mandatory minimum penalty, but offenders who are convicted of offenses with mandatory minimums are being sent to prison for longer
periods. For example, the [U.S. Sentencing Commission or] USSC
found that, compared to FY1990 (43.6%), a larger proportion of defendants convicted of offenses that carried a mandatory minimum
penalty in FY2010 (55.5%) were convicted of offenses that carried a
mandatory minimum penalty of five years or more. 79

Mandatory minimums have increased in number, length, and coverage.
Between 1991 and 2011, the number of mandatory minimums doubled from
98 to 195.80 They were added to more offenses, including child pornography
crimes and aggravated identity theft, though drug and weapons offenses make
up the greatest proportion of mandatory minimum bearing convictions.81 In
addition, not only are mandatory minimums increasing in number but prosecutors are securing convictions that carry longer minimums. In 1990, roughly
half of defendants were convicted of a crime subject to a mandatory minimum penalty, and 34.4% of those defendants were convicted of a crime subject to a ten-year mandatory minimum.82 By 2010, five-year convictions had
fallen to 39.9% but ten-year convictions had grown to 40.7%;83 defendants
Id.
Id.
Id.
2011 MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 4, at 71-72.
Id. at 72-73. In fiscal year 2010, 77.2% of defendants convicted of violating
a statute carrying a mandatory minimum penalty were convicted of a drug trafficking
offense (down from 91.1% in 1991), and 11.9% (up from 4.5% in 1991) were convicted of a firearms offense. Id. at 73.
82. Id. at 75.
83. Id.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
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subject to mandatory minimums of greater than ten years increased as well,
from 9.0% to 11.9%.84
The number of defendants sentenced to mandatory minimums has increased as well, from 6,681 in 1990 to 19,896 in 2010.85 Over this period,
people serving mandatory minimums accumulated in the federal system. On
September 30, 2010, 75,579 (39%) of the 191,757 offenders in BOP custody
were serving mandatory minimum sentences.86 And the sentences they were
serving were longer as well. In 2010, the average mandatory minimum sentence imposed was 139 months, in contrast to forty-eight months for all offenses.87 Even at 2010 prices, the cost is staggering. If the cost of incarceration remained constant, we would pay $5,627,416,473.60 for the 19,896 people sentenced to mandatory minimums in 2010.88

B. Sentencing Guidelines Anchored to Mandatory Minimums
A little more than 60% of prisoners incarcerated in 2010 were not serving mandatory minimum sentences; they were serving sentences arrived at by
using the federal Sentencing Guidelines.89 The majority of the guidelines for
offenses covered by mandatory minimums are anchored by mandatory minimums. And while the guidelines themselves are no longer mandatory, judges
are obliged to first calculate the applicable sentencing guideline before moving to the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) inquiry.90 In 2012, 84.5% of sentences fell
within or above the guidelines, or only fell below them due to a government
motion or a guidelines-sanctioned judicial departure.91 In 2012, judges sen-

84. Id. at 76.
85. Id. at 76, fig.4.7.
86. Request for Public Comment, supra note 51, at 4 (citing 2011 MANDATORY

MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 4, at 148).
87. Id. (citing 2011 MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 4, at 136).
88. This is based on the average cost of incarceration in federal prison in 2010
($28,284.16 according to the Administrative Office of the Courts), the average length
of the sentence of 11.58 years (reduced to approximately ten years for good time); see
18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)) for the 19,896 people sentenced to mandatory minimums that
year. Ad. Office of the U.S. Courts, Newly Available: Costs of Incarceration and
Supervision in FY 2010, THE THIRD BRANCH (June 23, 2011), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/News/NewsView/11-06-23/Newly_Available_Costs_of_
Incarceration_and_Supervision_in_FY_2010.aspx.
89. See 2011 MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 4, at 140.
90. Request for Public Comment, supra note 51, at 4 (citing Gall v. United
States, 552 U. S. 38, 49 (2007)).
91. Id. at 5 (citing UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM’N, 2012 SOURCEBOOK OF
FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, tbl.N (2013) [hereinafter 2012 SOURCEBOOK],
available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_
Sourcebooks/2012/sbtoc12.htm).
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tenced within the applicable guidelines in over 82% of cases, indicating the
guidelines’ continuing influence over sentencing.92
Until 2009, drug trafficking convictions comprised the largest percentage of the federal criminal docket for a number of years.93 The Commission,
in drafting the drug guideline, chose to link it to the five- and ten-year mandatory minimum sentences set by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.94
The drafters set the corresponding starting points to hover slightly above
the mandatory minimums.95 For example, a drug quantity that triggers a
mandatory minimum of five years is assigned a guideline offense level that
begins with sixty-three months, and the drug quantity that triggers the tenyear mandatory minimum is set at 121 months for guideline purposes.96 This
was done to provide some assistance to prosecutors seeking incentives for
plea negotiations.97 The Commission then arranged drug quantities around
those anchor points, spreading drug sentencing base offense levels across
seventeen guideline ranges.98 Because the mandatory minimums served as
the floor – or more appropriately, the basement – for the corresponding sentencing guidelines, “all sentences for that crime, regardless of the circumstances of the crime or the offender, are arrayed above . . . .” them.99 According to the Commission,
no other decision of the Commission has had such a profound impact
on the federal prison population. The drug trafficking guideline that
ultimately was promulgated, in combination with the relevant conduct
rule . . . had the effect of increasing prison terms far above what had
been typical in past practice, and in many cases above the level required by the literal terms of the mandatory minimum statutes. 100

These choices were not only unprecedented; they were uncalled for.
The Commission acknowledged that in crafting guidelines it has choices
92. Id.
93. 2011 MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 4, at 152; see also Request

for Public Comment, supra note 51, at 9.
94. Request for Public Comment, supra note 51, at 9 (citing UNITED STATES
SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINE SENTENCING 49 (Nov. 2004)
[hereinafter FIFTEEN YEAR REPORT], available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research_
and_Statistics/Research_Projects/Miscellaneous/15_Year_Study/index.cfm).
95. 2011 MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 4, at 53.
96. FIFTEEN YEAR REPORT, supra note 94, at 49.
97. See id. at 77.
98. Id. at 49.
99. Mandatory Minimums: Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 111th
Cong. 8 (May 27, 2010) (Statement of James E. Felman, on behalf of the American
Bar Association), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/
Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/20100527/Testimony_Felman_ABA.pdf.
100. Request for Public Comment, supra note 51, at 9 (quoting FIFTEEN YEAR
REPORT, supra note 94, at 49).
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when indexing them to mandatory minimums. It explained in 2009 that,
when faced with drafting guidelines for an offense that includes a mandatory
minimum, it has four choices. Its first choice is to set the base offense level –
which is the starting point for determining the guideline sentencing range for
the offense – so it exceeds the mandatory minimum. This is how the drug
guidelines generally are handled, as discussed immediately above. Second, it
is able to set the base offense level so that the mandatory minimum is contained within the corresponding guideline range. This is how crack cocaine
was handled for a brief period; the mandatory minimum for crack cocaine
was five years for an offense involving five grams, but the guideline assigned
a corresponding base offense level of 24, with a guideline range of 51 to 63
months. Third, it can set the corresponding base offense level below the
mandatory minimum and, if necessary, rely on specific enhancements to
achieve a mandatory minimum sentence. Finally, it can set the base offense
level without regard to the mandatory minimum.101 The Commission has on
occasion crafted or amended guidelines with corresponding mandatory minimums using all four methods,102 but the drug guidelines – with a couple of
notable exceptions103 – include base offense levels higher than the otherwise
applicable mandatory minimum. Practitioners and experts have urged the
Commission to end the practice.104
101. Id. at 10 (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, THE HISTORY OF THE CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY GUIDELINES 45-46 (Oct. 2009) [hereinafter CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
HISTORY] available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_Statistics/Research_Projects/Sex_Offenses/20091030_History_Child_Pornography_Guidelines.pdf.
102. Id. (citing U.S SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2(a) (2012) (setting
base offense levels for trafficking in child pornography below the mandatory minimum and including enhancements that can increase the sentence to or above it); see
also CHILD PORNOGRAPHY HISTORY, supra note 101 at 46-49; U.S SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(b)(1) (2012) (assessing a two-level enhancement when
a gun is possessed by a defendant in connection with a drug trafficking offense, notwithstanding the five-year mandatory minimum sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)
(2012) for a conviction of possessing a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking
offense); U.S SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(E) (2012) (assigning a
weight for marijuana plants of 100 grams rather than the statutory assessment of
1000 grams per plant in 21 U.S.C. §. 841(b)(1)(A)(vii)); U.S SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(G) (2012) (subtracting the weight of the carrier medium from the weight of LSD calculated under the guidelines and assigning each dose
of LSD a uniform weight, in contrast to 21 U.S.C. §. 841(b)(1)(A)(v) which weighs
the entire dose, including the carrier medium).
103. See supra note 102 (discussing the calculation of LSD carrier mediums and
marijuana plants).
104. Request for Public Comment, supra note 51, at 10. The Request for Public
Comment provides recent examples. Id. at 10 n.40 (Letter from Julie Stewart and
Mary Price (FAMM) to Hon. Patti B. Saris, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 15-16
(July 23, 2012), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Meetings_and_Rulemaking/Public_
Comment/20120815/FAMM_priorities_comment.pdf (urging across the board two-
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Anchoring the guidelines in this fashion has had profound consequences. Today, nearly half of all federal prisoners are incarcerated for drug offenses – half of whom are first time offenders – and are serving sentences
that, while falling, still averaged sixty-eight months in 2012.105 The Urban
Institute’s recent study of the factors that have increased the BOP population
found that “the growth in the BOP population from 1998 to 2010 confirmed
that time served in prison, particularly for drug offenses, was the largest determinant of the growth in the population.”106 Time served for those offenders is inextricably linked to the mandatory minimum sentences on which the
guidelines are based.

C. Faux Proportionality: Mandatory Minimums and Guidelines
Associated with Them Encourage the Upward Ratchet in Guideline
Sentences for Other Offenses
Several observers have noted that mandatory minimums and the guidelines linked to them have lifted – or been cited in support of lifting – other
guideline-based sentences, including those not associated with mandatory
minimums. The CRS recently found:
While only offenders convicted for an offense carrying a mandatory
minimum penalty are subject to those penalties, mandatory minimum
penalties have, in effect, increased sentences for other offenders. The
USSC has incorporated many mandatory minimum penalties into the
sentencing guidelines, which means that penalties for other offense
categories under the guidelines had to increase in order to keep a sense
of proportionality.107

This sham proportionality has operated in only one direction, prompting the
Judicial Conference’s Criminal Law Committee to chide the Commission for
level reduction of drug base offense levels); JASMINE TYLER, DRUG POLICY
ALLIANCE, PUBLIC COMMENTS SUBMITTED TO THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMMISSION REGARDING PROPOSED PRIORITIES FOR 2013 4-5 (July 31, 2012), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Meetings_and_Rulemaking/Public_Comment/20120815/
DPA_priorities_comment.pdf (arguing for a reduction of all drug sentencing guidelines by two levels); Letter from Marjorie E. Meyers to Hon. Patti B. Saris, Chair,
U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 3-5 (Aug. 26, 2011), available at http://www.
ussc.gov/Meetings_and_Rulemaking/Public_Comment/20110826/Defender-PrioritesComments_2011-2012.pdf; Letter from Marc Mauer to Hon. Patti B. Saris, Chair,
U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 1-2 (Aug. 22, 2011), available at http://www.ussc.
gov/Meetings_and_Rulemaking/Public_Comment/20110826/SentencingProject_Pub
Comm_2012_priorities.pdf.
105. SAMUELS ET AL., supra note 2, at 11 (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2012
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, fig. E, table 14).
106. Id.
107. CRS Report, supra note 52, at 8.
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addressing proportionality concerns by increasing penalties.108 In a letter to
the Commission, Judge Sim Lake, chair of the Criminal Law Committee,
stated, “The Committee believes that the goal of proportionality should not
become a one-way ratchet for increasing sentences. . . .”109
However, the Commission is not entirely to blame; Congress also
played a role. For example, when the guidelines for certain economic crimes
were reconsidered following the collapse of Enron and the enactment of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, “the ‘penalty gap’ between fraud and drug cases was
used to pressure the Commission to amend U.S. Sentencing Guideline §
2B1.1.”110 With Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress raised the statutory maximum for
certain offenses and directed the Commission to respond quickly.111 The
Commission – with the assistance of practitioners, the judiciary, the DOJ, law
professors, and probation officers – had just two years earlier capped a fiveyear process of study and drafting to produce the 2001 Economic Crime
Package.112 Nonetheless, it held hearings to consider additional amendments
made necessary by Sarbanes-Oxley.113 All witnesses, save the DOJ, opposed
general increases, which the Commission was resistant to as well.114 Senator
Joseph Biden, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on
Crime and Drugs, was not content to leave the Commission to its own devices.115 His committee held several hearings, including one in the summer of
2002 entitled “Are We Really Getting Tough on White Collar Crime?”116
Shortly before the Commission’s April 2003 meeting to vote on whether and
how much to amend the guidelines, Senator Biden “inserted into the Congressional Record a ‘legislative history’ of Title IX of Sarbanes-Oxley which
suggested quite plainly that Senator Biden wanted an across-the-board guideline increase for economic crimes.”117 He wrote:

108. Request for Public Comment, supra note 51, at 5.
109. Letter from Hon. Sim Lake, Chair of the Judicial Conference Comm. on

Criminal Law, to Members of the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 3-4 (Mar. 8, 2004) (on
file with the author).
110. Luna & Cassell, supra note 49, at 53 n.65.
111. Frank O. Bowman, III, Pour Encourager Les Autres? The Curious History
and Distressing Implications of the Criminal Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
and the Sentencing Guidelines Amendments That Followed, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
373, 411 (2004).
112. Id. at 388-90.
113. Id. at 431.
114. Id.
115. See id.
116. See Penalties for White Collar Crime Offenses: Are We Really Getting
Tough on Crime?: Hearing on H.R. 3763 Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs,
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 1-17 (2002), reprinted in 15 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 234 (2003).
117. Bowman, supra note 111, at 431.
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Congress in particular is concerned about base offense levels which
may be too low. The increased sentences, while mean[ing] to punish
the most egregious offenders more severely, are also intended to raise
sentences at the lower end of the sentencing guidelines. While Congress acknowledges that the Sentencing Commission’s recent amendments are a step in the right direction, the Commission is again directed to consider closely the testimony adduced at the hearings by the
Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs respecting the ongoing
“penalty gap” between white-collar and other offenses. To the extent
that the “penalty gap” existed, in part, by virtue of higher sentences for
narcotics offenses, for example, Congress responded by increasing
sentences for certain white-collar offenses. Accordingly, we ask the
Commission to consider the issues raised herein; determine if adjustments are warranted in light of the enhanced penalty provisions contained in this title; and make recommendations accordingly. 118

This perversion of overall sentencing “proportionality” has had an impact. Sentence lengths for economic crime offenses have risen dramatically
and particularly for high-end loss crimes, because – like the drug guidelines
that Senator Biden asked the Commission to emulate, which are based on
drug quantities – the fraud guideline is dominated by the loss table, which
increases with the amount of loss or intended loss.119 Sentences for serious
fraud offenses increased from an average of eighty-nine months in 2004 to
123 months in 2011.120
This sentence escalation has attracted a lot of attention. One judge
commented that “we now have an advisory guideline[] regime where . . . any
officer or director of virtually any public corporation who has committed
securities fraud will be confronted with a guideline calculation either calling
for or approaching lifetime imprisonment.”121 Professor Frank Bowman, a
former federal prosecutor, concluded that the “rules governing high-end federal white-collar sentences are now completely untethered from both criminal
law theory and common sense.”122 The result is counterproductive as judges

118. Id. (citing 149 Cong. Rec. S5328 (daily ed. Apr. 11, 2003) (statement of
Senator Joseph Biden)).
119. David Debold & Matthew Benjamin, “Losing Ground” in Search of a Remedy for the Overemphasis on Loss and Other Culpability Factors in the Sentencing
Guidelines for Fraud and Theft, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 141, 142 (2011).
120. The Status of Federal Sentencing and the U.S. Sentencing Commission Six
Years After U.S. v. Booker: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism and
Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 5-6 (Testimony of
James E. Felman on Behalf of the American Bar Association) (2011), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Felman%2010112011.pdf.
121. U.S. v. Parris, 573 F.Supp.2d 744, 754 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
122. Frank O. Bowman, Sacrificial Felon: Life Sentences for Marquee White
Collar Criminals Don’t Make Sense, AM. LAW., Jan 2007, at 63.
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vote with their variances123 from the guidelines and express themselves in
scathing opinions calling the guidelines “patently absurd on their face,”124 “a
black stain on common sense,”125 and, ultimately, “of no help.”126

D. The Threat of New Mandatory Minimums or Mandatory Guidelines
In recent years, the DOJ and some members of Congress have suggested
that Congress adopt new mandatory minimums in order to ensure that sentences – especially in the economic crime arena, where variances have increased – be stabilized. Testifying before the Commission about mandatory
minimums in 2010, the DOJ acknowledged the “heavy price” extracted by
mandatory minimums, decried the growth in the BOP, but then announced it
was carefully considering asking Congress to impose new mandatory sentences for certain white collar offenses.127 A few months later, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Preet Bharara, also endorsed
the idea of so-called “modest mandatory minimums,” stating that “there are
not that many mandatory minimums in the white collar context. Perhaps
there should be.”128 By September 2011, the DOJ reiterated its call for a review but appeared to have abandoned its concern that white collar sentencing
practices require mandatory sentences, calling instead for specific enhancements in key areas.129 Meanwhile, in early 2011, Senator Charles Grassley
urged Congress to revisit the advisory nature of the sentencing guidelines,
decrying variances in economic crime sentencing and raising the alarm:
123. The average minimum sentenced called for in the fraud guideline has more
than doubled since 1996, and judges have responded by reducing fraud sentences on
average 52.8% below the guideline minimum (the largest judge-led reductions for any
guideline offense). See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT ON THE CONTINUING
IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 67, 92 (2012) available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congress-ional_Testimony_ and_Reports/Booker_Reports/2012_Booker/index.cfm.
124. United States v. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d 506, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
125. Parris, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 754.
126. United States v. Watt, 707 F. Supp. 2d 149, 151 (D. Mass. 2010).
127. Mandatory Minimums: Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 111th
Cong. 24, 26-27 (May 27, 2010) (Testimony of Sally Quillian Yates on behalf of the
Department of Justice), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_
Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/20100527/Hearing_Transcript.pdf.
128. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, United States
Sentencing Commission, 111th Cong. 60 (February 16, 2011) (Testimony of Preet
Bharara), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_
Hearings_and_Meetings/20110216/Hearing_Transcript.pdf.
129. Letter from Lanny A. Breuer, Asst. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of J. and Jonathan
J. Wroblewski, Dir., Office of Policy & Legis., to Hon. Patti B. Saris, Chair, U.S.
Sentencing Comm’n 6 (Sept. 2, 2011), available at http://www.ussc.
gov/Meetings_and_Rulemaking/Public_Comment/20110826/USDOJ-Annual-Letter2011.pdf.
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[C]riminal fraud will not be adequately deterred unless we revisit the
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker. . . . Now that
the Guidelines have been held to be merely advisory, the disparity and
unfairness in judicially imposed sentences that we sought to eliminate
on a bipartisan basis are returning, especially in two areas: child pornography and fraud cases of the type we are discussing today. If potential fraudsters view the lenient sentences now being handed down
as merely a cost of doing business, efforts to combat criminal fraud
could be undermined.130

The Commission is very sensitive to signals from the DOJ and Congress
and, to some extent, sees its role as ensuring that guideline sentences are appropriately severe so that they will secure approval from Congress, which can
disapprove a guideline amendment. Congress has indicated its interest in
severity either by directly amending the guidelines, as it did with the
PROTECT Act of 2003,131 or directing the Commission to do so.132

VI. PROPORTIONATE SENTENCES ARE SHORTER
AND SAFER SENTENCES
Tackling over-incarceration could be a relatively straightforward task.
Indeed, there have been a variety of proposals over the years to lessen the
pressure on the federal prison population by designing mechanisms aimed at
releasing some prisoners early.133 However, these mechanisms have not
gained traction. While such efforts to secure these so-called “back-end fixes”
are commendable, unless we abate the flow of prisoners into the system at the
130. Protecting American Taxpayers: Significant Accomplishments and Ongoing
Challenges in the Fight Against Fraud: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 4 (2011) (statement of Sen. Chuck Grassley, Ranking Member, S.
Comm. on the Judiciary).
131. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children
Today Act of 2003, Pub.L. 108–21, 117 Stat. 650 (codified as amended in scattered
section of 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., & 42 U.S.C.) Section 104 of the PROTECT Act
included a directive to the Commission to amend the guidelines to include specified
enhancements.
132. NATIONAL FEDERAL DEFENDER RESOURCE COUNSEL, CONGRESSIONAL
DIRECTIVES TO THE SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1988 – 2013 1 (Nov. 2013), available
at http://www.fd.org/docs/select-topics---sentencing/SRC-directives-Table-November-2011.pdf.
133. See, e.g., The Second Chance Reauthorization Act of 2011, S. 1231, 112th
Cong. § 4 (providing for increased good time and earned good time credits); see also
The Literacy, Education and Rehabilitation Act, H.R. 3602, 109th Cong. (2005)
(providing for credit toward completion of sentence for prisoners participating in
programming); The Federal Prison Bureau Nonviolent Offender Relief Act of 2013,
H.R. 62, 113th Cong. (providing for release after 50% of the sentence served for eligible prisoners).
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front end and address the length of time they are sentenced to serve, we are
simply bailing out the overflowing bathtub without turning off the tap.
However straightforward, tackling the over-incarceration problem will
require a paradigm shift by lawmakers. Since the mid-1980s, our criminal
justice approach has been to incarcerate our way to safety. Over the years,
observers have criticized mandatory sentencing schemes as unjust, ineffective, harmful to communities and families, expensive, and rife with unintended consequences.134 A number of experts have examined the impact that
lowering prison terms and diverting some low-level prisoners away from
incarceration might have on public safety. They found that shortening the
length of time prisoners serve and the rate at which they are released does not
bear on the likelihood of recidivism.135 In other words, according to criminal
justice experts we can shorten prison sentences without compromising public
safety.136 Today, however, we are at a new juncture; unless we reduce the
number of people in prison, our addiction to incarceration could endanger
public safety.137
Fortunately, “reducing mass incarceration is conceptually simple: We
need to send fewer people to prison and for shorter lengths of time.”138 While
lawmakers have some control over how many people are sent to prison, that
control is rather indirect; it stems from the number and nature of the criminal
laws Congress passes or repeals. On the other hand, Congress has a much
more direct path to addressing mass incarceration: addressing the sentences
called for when our laws are broken. Certainly Congress could reduce or
even eliminate all mandatory minimum sentences and direct the Commission
to amend the guidelines to make corresponding changes. Such dramatic legislation would undoubtedly result in lower sentences because judges would be
able to use the advisory guideline system to fashion individualized, proportionate sentences.
We know that requiring proportionate sentences frequently leads to
shorter sentences. Given the opportunity to fashion a sentence based not only
on the offense and aggravating circumstances but also on an individual’s
characteristics and influences, judges tend to impose lower sentences. For
example, consider the federal safety valve; champions of the five- and tenyear mandatory minimums for drug crimes intended that they be imposed on
“major” and “serious” drug traffickers:
134. See 1991 MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 8, at 90-110 (summarizing views, litigation and resolutions); 2011 MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra
note 4, at 90-104 (the same), Appendix J (summarizing testimony to Commission).
135. See, e.g., Todd R. Clear & James Austin, Reducing Mass Incarceration:
Implications of the Iron Law of Prison Populations, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 307,
309-11 (2009).
136. Id.
137. See, supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
138. Lynn Adelman, What the Sentencing Commission Ought to Be Doing: Reducing Mass Incarceration, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 295, 297 (2013).
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For the kingpins – the masterminds who are really running these operations – and they can be identified by the amount of drugs with which
they are involved – we require a jail term upon conviction. If it is
their first conviction, the minimum term is 10 years . . . . Our proposal
would also provide mandatory minimum penalties for the middle-level
dealers as well. Those criminals would also have to serve time in jail.
The minimum sentences would be slightly less than those for the
kingpins, but they nevertheless would have to jail – a minimum of 5
years for the first offense. 139

Following the enactment of drug-related mandatory minimum
sentences in the mid-1980s, it became apparent that the harsh, one-size-fitsall sentences for drug offenders reached well beyond the “major” and
“serious” drug traffickers their champions cited. The Commission reported
to Congress in 1991 that the mandatory minimums did a poor job of
meeting the expectations that prompted them.140 One particular criticism
addressed the failure of the sentences to distinguish culpability or to guarantee proportional sentences:
By requiring the same sentence for defendants who are markedly dissimilar in their level of participation in the offense and in objective indications of post-offense reform, these mandatory minimum provisions . . . short-circuit the guidelines’ design of implementing sentences that seek to be proportional to the defendant’s level of culpability
and need for punishment.141

The release of the Commission’s report prompted Congress to rethink
the reach of drug-related mandatory minimums. While the Senate debated a
harsh new crime bill to ensure life sentences for certain offenders, increase
penalties for use of a firearm in commission of a drug trafficking crime, and
implement other tough on crime measures, Republican Senator Orrin Hatch
discussed amending the criminal code to ensure some flexibility in sentencing
for first-time offenders:
I have talked with judges all over this country, and they have all indicated to me, most all have indicated to me – and I do not know of any
139. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 6-7
(2002) (quoting 132 CONG. REC. 27,193-94 (Sept. 30, 1986) (statement of Sen. Robert
Byrd)) available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/Drug_Topics/200205_RtC_Cocaine_Sentencing_Polic
y/200205_Cocaine_and_Federal_Sentencing_Policy.pdf; see also id. at 7 n.21 (citing
132 CONG. REC. 22, 993 (Sept. 11, 1986) (statement of Rep. LaFalce) (“[S]eparate
penalties are established for the biggest traffickers, with another set of penalties for
other serious drug pushers.”).
140. 1991 MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 8, at 33-34.
141. Id. at 28.
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objections – that they need more flexibility in some of these cases because the mandatory minimums are resulting in injustices. So this
amendment will bring a greater measure of credibility to our criminal
justice system. I can think of no issue more vital to our national interest than the control of drug abuse and violent crime. The Hatch
amendment, which, of course, includes the Gramm amendments, will
help restore credibility in our criminal justice system by ensuring that
violent offenders and recidivists will face enhanced mandatory minimum sentences, by returning a measured degree of discretion to the
courts in cases involving first-time, nonviolent drug offenders.142

Congress adopted a safety valve very similar to the one proposed by Senator
Hatch in 1994. It applies in drug trafficking cases only and directs the court
to waive the mandatory minimum sentence if the court finds the defendant
meets certain statutory criteria.143 At least 80,000 defendants have benefitted
from this safety valve since its adoption.144
The safety valve directs judges to use the advisory guidelines to impose
a sentence. As discussed in Part II above, sentencing under the advisory
guidelines involves not only a calculation of the applicable guideline
sentence, but also a comprehensive and individualized inquiry into the nature
of the offense, the characteristics and history of the defendant, and the imposition of a sentence no greater than necessary. In other words, once freed
from the grip of mandatory sentencing, judges are obliged to conduct an individualized inquiry, resulting in a sentence proportioned to both the offense
and offender.
Such proportionality saves money and bed spaces. In 2010 alone, of
the 15,257 people convicted of a drug offense carrying a mandatory minimum sentence, 5,539 received the safety valve.145 That year, defendants
who remained subject to the mandatory minimum and did not receive
the benefit of the safety valve – or a substantial assistance motion by the

142. 139 Cong. Rec. S 15257, 1993 WL 455658 (Nov. 8, 1993) (statement of
Senator Orrin Hatch) [hereinafter Hatch Statement].
143. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (stating that the court may waive the mandatory minimum and sentence the defendant using the federal Sentencing Guidelines if it finds
that the defendant has no or very limited criminal history; did not use or threaten
violence or possess a firearm; that the offense did not result in death or serious bodily
injury; that the defendant was not the organizer or leader and the defendant truthfully
provided the government all information concerning the offense or related offenses).
144. FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, SAFETY VALVES IN A NUTSHELL
2 (July 7, 2012), available at http://www.famm.org/Repository/Files/FS%
20Safety%20valves%20in%20a%20nutshell%206.27.12.pdf.
145. Request for Public Comment, supra note 51, at 7 (citing U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N, 2010 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 113 tbl.44 (2010)
[hereinafter 2010 SOURCEBOOK], available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research_
and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2010/Table44.pdf).
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prosecutor146 – were sentenced to an average of 132 months.147 In contrast,
defendants who received safety valve relief received average sentences of
forty-nine months,148 an eighty-three month difference. What is unknowable
from the available statistics is what sentence those 5,539 safety valve defendants would have received had they not been safety valve eligible. We can
expect that they would have been sentenced to terms shorter than the 132
month average. This is because defendants eligible for the safety valve are
less culpable than other defendants and, while they would have been subject
to the mandatory minimum, their sentences would not have been enhanced
for possession of weapons, significant criminal history, or for being a leader
or organizer.149 In other words, more culpable defendants are not eligible for
the safety valve and are thus are more likely on average to receive higher
sentences, enhanced even above the applicable mandatory minimum.
That said, the savings in bed space and money cannot help but be significant.150 Assuming those 5,539 defendants saw their sentences reduced by
only twelve months from the otherwise applicable mandatory minimum, the
overall savings is 5,539 prison years.151 Today, it costs the BOP on average
$28,893.40 per year to incarcerate a federal prisoner.152 The BOP estimates,
however, that because many of the costs of housing prisoners are fixed costs
related to maintain facilities, the average savings of decreasing a prison population by a single prisoner is $10,362.153 Using that figure, the safety valve
savings generated in 2010 would be at least $57,400,657. Unfortunately, the
safety valve only applies to drug defendants and only to a subset of those who
meet the narrow criteria.
Similarly, lowering mandatory minimums reduces time in prison. The
enactment of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA)154 affected both sentence
length and the number of people subject to mandatory minimums for crack
cocaine. The reform raised the triggering quantities for crack cocaine mandatory minimums from five grams to twenty-eight grams for the five-year mandatory minimum and from fifty grams to 280 grams for the ten-year penalty.155 In 2012, the 3,388 defendants sentenced for crack cocaine received
average sentences of ninety-seven months, which is fourteen months shorter
146. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e).
147. Request for Public Comment, supra note 51, at 7 (citing 2011 MANDATORY

MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 4, at 161).
148. Id. (citing 2011 MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 4, at 161).
149. Id. (citing 2011 MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 4, at 137).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 8.
152. Id. (citing Annual Determination of Average Cost of Incarceration, 78 Fed.
Reg. 16711-02 (Mar. 18, 2013)).
153. Samuels, et al. supra note 105 at 13.
154. Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 841,
844, 960).
155. Id.
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than the pre-FSA crack sentences.156 Savings generated that year were
$40,362,425.
Lowering crack cocaine sentences and raising the triggering quantities
for the mandatory minimums has also had an impact on the number of people
entering federal prison. In 2007, the Sentencing Commission reduced all
crack cocaine guideline sentences by two levels and starting in 2008 the
number of people prosecuted for crack cocaine offenses began to fall.157 The
FSA continued the trend, exerting what seems to have been a calming effect
on crack cocaine prosecutions. While the number of people sentenced for all
other drug offenses has risen since 2010,158 the number of individuals prosecuted for crack cocaine offenses fell. While judges sentenced 4,742 defendants for crack cocaine offenses in FY 2010, by 2012 the number had fallen to
3,388.159 That is a 31% drop in successful crack cocaine prosecutions and
represents $14,031,502 that we will not spend incarcerating low level crack
cocaine offenders this year alone. While there could have been a 30% drop in
crack cocaine trafficking over those two years, it appears more likely that
removing the incentive for prosecutors to go after such low-hanging fruit
means they are redirected to more serious offenders, or at least to those drug
offenders still generating lengthy sentences.

VII. WINNING OVER THE SKEPTICS: PROPORTIONALITY AND THE
OLD TOUGH ON CRIME CROWD
Mandatory minimum reform will not succeed unless it is bipartisan. In
these highly partisan times that sounds like a very tall order; however, both
the safety valve adopted in 1994 and the FSA enjoyed bipartisan support.
The FSA originated in the Senate and its original sponsors were Senator Dick
Durbin, a Democrat from Illinois, and Republican Senator Jeff Sessions of
Alabama. The bill passed in the Senate by unanimous consent and passed in

156. 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 91, at fig. J, available at http://www.ussc.
gov/Research_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2012/FigureJ.pdf.
157
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, ANALYSIS OF DRUG TRAFFICKING OFFENDERS, Fig. 2
(Jan. 2014) available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_
Hearings_and_Meetings/20140109/Data-Presentation.pdf.
158. Compare 2010 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 145, at fig. J, available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/201
0/FigureJ.pdf, with 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 91, at fig. J, available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/201
2/FigureJ.pdf.
159. Compare 2010 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 145, at fig. J, available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/201
0/FigureJ.pdf, with 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 91, at fig. J, available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/201
2/FigureJ.pdf.
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the House on a voice vote.160 Senator Hatch was key to ensuring the introduction and passage of the safety valve in 1994. Admittedly, neither the FSA
nor the safety valve was prompted by concerns about mass incarceration, if
transcripts of sponsor statements and floor speeches are any indication of
what motivated sponsors and supporters,161 but both have had a profound
impact on the ability of judges to assess more proportionate sentences.
Those who have been working for sentencing reform for many years
have a lot to feel optimistic about in the present political climate due to new
partners from an unexpected quarter. There is a vibrant conservative movement for criminal justice reform.162 From the Heritage Foundation to the
American Legislative Exchange Council, leaders of conservative thought and
action are taking up criminal justice reform.163 Conservative activist Eli Lehrer calls this development “the most important social reform movement on
the right since the rise of the pro-life movement of the 1970s.”164
The movement drew motivation from creative work in red states where
prisons were bloated by years of tough-on-crime policies and where budgets
were blasted by the financial crisis.165 A number of those states have taken
steps to cut spending on prisons.166 The new movement spawned “a sea
change in conservative thinking” among “political leaders with rock-solid
conservative credentials.”167
Republican lawmakers and governors who once favored long sentences
to control crime in states such as Texas, Georgia, Ohio, Kentucky,
South Carolina, and South Dakota are now leading a charge to “replace
160. See S. 1789, Bill Summary and Status, Major Congressional Actions, 111th
Cong. (noting unanimous consent and the bi-partisan list of co-sponsors), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:SN01789:@@@R.
161. See Hatch Statement, supra note 142 (remarks of Sen. Orrin Hatch introducing Safety Valve amendment); see also CONG. REC., 111th Cong. H 6202 (July
28, 2010), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?r111:7:./temp/
~r111M9 LunZ:e60208 (statement of Rep. Dan Lungren who noted, “Certainly, one
of the sad ironies in this entire episode is that a bill which was characterized by some
as a response to the crack epidemic in African American communities has led to racial sentencing disparities which simply cannot be ignored in any reasoned discussion
of this issue. When African Americans, low-level crack defendants, represent ten
times the number of low-level white crack defendants, I don’t think we can simply
close our eyes.”).
162. Request for Public Comment, supra note 51, at 5.
163. Id.
164. Id. (citing Neil King, Jr., As Prisons Squeeze Budgets, GOP Rethinks Crime
Focus, WALL STREET J., June 21, 2013, at A1, available at http://online.
wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323836504578551902602217018).
165. King, supra note 164.
166. Id.
167. Eli Lehrer, The Party of Prison Reform: Conservatives Lead the Way, THE
WKLY. STANDARD (March 18, 2013) http://staging.weeklystandard.com/print/articles/
party-prison-reform_706676.html.
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tough-on-crime dictums of the 1990s with a more forgiving and nuanced
set of laws.”168 Over half of the nation’s states have begun to overhaul their
criminal justice systems and the majority of those states are Republicanled.169 This movement is producing results; according to the DOJ, state
prison populations continued the decline begun in 2010 after peaking in 2009
at 1.4 million.170
Born of concerns over the excessive cost of incarceration, this movement grafts traditional conservative principles and language onto a new
approach to criminal justice. Richard Viguerie, perhaps best known as the
father of conservative direct mail fundraising, identifies the prison population crisis as symptomatic of errant big government, long a target of
traditional conservatives.171 He argues that criminal justice spending ought
to be subject to the same level of scrutiny as other government spending programs that conservatives like to decry.172 Viguerie does not stop there; prisons, he says, harm families and prisoners – people who are deserving of
compassion – while turning out prisoners who are more harmful to society
for their stay.173 He further states that three principles: “public safety,
compassion and controlled government spending – lie at the core of conservative philosophy.”174
Meanwhile, the conservative organization Right on Crime brings together the cream of the crop in an effort to rethink and reshape approaches to
crime and punishment.175 Right on Crime is the brainchild of the Texas Public Policy Foundation, a conservative think tank that led the successful effort
to stem the increase in prison construction in Texas starting in 2007,176 which
many saw as the kick-off to state-led campaigns to stabilize or reduce incarceration rates.177 Right on Crime’s organizing principles are:

168. King, supra note 164.
169. Id.; see also FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, TURNING OFF THE

SPIGOT: HOW SENTENCING SAFETY VALVES CAN HELP STATES PROTECT PUBLIC
SAFETY AND SAVE MONEY 13-18 (2013), available at http://www.famm.org/Repository/Files/Turning%20Off%20the%20Spigot%20web%20final.pdf (cataloguing state
safety valve statutes).
170. E. ANNE CARSON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS
IN 2011 2 (2012), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p11.pdf.
171. Richard A. Viguerie, A Conservative Case for Prison Reform, N.Y. TIMES,
June 10, 2013, at A23, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/10/opinion/aconservative-case-for-prison-reform.html.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. King, supra note 164.
176. See id.
177. See id.; see also Viguerie, supra note 171.
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grounded in time-tested conservative truths – constitutionally limited
government, transparency, individual liberty, personal responsibility,
free enterprise, and the centrality of the family and community. All of
these are critical to addressing today’s criminal justice challenges. It
is time to apply these principles to the task of delivering a better return
on taxpayers’ investments in public safety. Our security, prosperity,
and freedom depend on it.178

The tough-on-crime narrative is giving way to a more thoughtful, responsible approach to crime and punishment. Mark Levin, policy director for
Right on Crime, reflected recently that “[w]e don’t say conservatives were
wrong in the 1980s and 1990s when they said ‘We need more prisons,’ . . . .
But as we expanded incarceration, we’ve swept in a lot of low-risk offenders
and spent a lot of money.”179 As conservatives find their footing in this new
arena, they are beginning to make common cause with traditional criminal
justice and prison reform supporters. Noting this momentum, Michael Gerson, formerly of the Bush White House, welcomes the “odd, ideological coalition that favors reform.”180 It includes liberals, libertarians, and evangelicals, coming together to address what Gerson calls the “Hoover Dam of
American social engineering: mass incarceration.”181
This movement identifies with the growing sentiment to address the dual
problems of over-federalization of crimes and over-criminalization of conduct. This concern reaches from the advocacy community to Capitol Hill. In
the advocacy community, right-left coalitions such as the Heritage Foundation’s Overcriminalization Working Group – which includes such heretofore
odd bedfellows as the Federalist Society, the American Civil Liberties Union,
FAMM, and the Cato Institute – meet monthly to share news and strategies to
lessen the criminalization of conduct.182 Meanwhile, on Capitol Hill a Republican-Democrat task force in the House of Representatives has held hearings to help the members sort out and grapple with the inordinate number of
crimes on the books and the tens of thousands of criminalized regulatory of-

178. Statement of Principles, RIGHT ON CRIME, http://www.rightoncrime.com/theconservative-case-for-reform/statement-of-principles/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2013).
179. Lehrer, supra note 167.
180. Michael Gerson, Op-Ed., Mass Incarceration’s Tragic Success, WASH. POST,
June 28, 2013, at A19, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/michael-gerson-mass-incarcerations-tragic-success/2013/06/27/7eb62518-df5b-11e2-b2d4ea6d8f477a01_story.html.
181. Id.
182. Defining the Problem and Scope of Over-Criminalization and OverFederalization: Hearing Before the Over-Criminalization Task Force of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (June 14, 2012), available at http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/2013/06/defining-the-problem-and-scope-of-overcriminalization-and-overfederalization (statement of John G. Malcolm, discussing, inter alia,
the Heritage Foundation’s Over-criminalization Working Group).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

31

Created on: 3/18/2014 5:32:00 PM
Missouri Law Review,
Vol. 78, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. Last
7 Printed: 4/10/2014 2:48:00 PM

File:Price – Final Formatting 3/9/14

1178

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

fenses.183 The task force is housed in the House Judiciary Committee, which
has the reputation of being among the most bitterly partisan committees on
the Hill. The problem of harsh sentencing is inextricably linked with overfederalization and over-incarceration.184 The link is simple: at the other end
of every unnecessary federal criminal law is a federal criminal sentence, and
most of those sentences result in incarceration. Only 7.1% of the 83,443 people sentenced for a federal crime in 2012 received a sentence of straight probation;185 of the remainder, 87.2% were sentenced to prison only.186
Fortunately, nationally known conservatives are identifying mandatory
minimums as a key criminal justice problem that the reform movement
should embrace. David Keene, former president of the National Rifle Association, observed: “Federal mandatory minimum laws are especially problematic. Not only do they transfer power from independent courts to a political executive [prosecutors], they also perpetuate the harmful trend of federalizing criminal activity that can better be prosecuted at the state level.”187
Conservative commentator Eli J. Lehrer, leader of a free-market think tank
and former Heritage Foundation fellow and speechwriter to Senator Bill
Frist,188 attributes the current low crime rate to incarceration policies. But in
a recent piece, he sounded an alarm about the costs of these policies:
Effective though mass incarceration is, however, the strategy is not
without its costs. These costs can be measured in fiscal terms, in the
failure of imprisonment to prevent certain repeat behavior, in the impact of incarceration on certain communities, and in the tension between high incarceration rates and democratic values. 189

He advocates for sharply shortened but swiftly applied mandatory minimum
sentences, combined with substance abuse treatment and compelled work in
harsh, but humane, settings.190
The principle and practice of proportionate sentencing should inform
any legislative reform in this area. Proportionality can be an essential tool to
ensure that prisons and lengthy terms of incarceration are reserved for those
183. See id. (additional statements are available at http://judiciary.house.
gov/hearings/113th/hear_06142013.html).
184. See Luna & Cassell, supra note 49, at 24.
185. 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 91, at tbl. 12, available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/201
2/Table12.pdf.
186. Id.
187. Keene, supra note 72.
188. Eli Lehrer, R STREET, http://www.rstreet.org/about/staff/eli-lehrer/.
189. Eli J. Lehrer, Responsible Prison Reform, NAT’L AFFAIRS (June 28,
2010), available at http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/responsibleprison-reform.
190. Id.
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offenders who deserve them. Proportionality also serves conservative values
of restraint in public spending and in restricting liberty by selecting for shorter sentences people who do not need to serve longer ones by virtue of their
culpability. Providing for proportionality can help ensure that prisons are not
filled with people who do not need to be there, and that funds are reserved for
catching, prosecuting, and incarcerating the people who do need to be there.

VIII. PROPORTIONALITY AND MANDATORY MINIMUM REFORM
While criminal justice reform swirls around the country, the federal
prison system continues to grow and sentencing reform enjoys unprecedented
bipartisan support. Such reform will become necessary if the public safety
threats of federal over-incarceration are to be averted. Mandatory minimum
sentencing must be part of the reform agenda and, short of repeal, helping
judges bypass those sentences in favor of ones better tailored to culpability is
a good start.
The Commission advocates for limited mandatory minimum reforms,
including safety valves, in its most recent report to Congress on the subject.
The recommendations include, among others: (1) expanding the current safety valve so that it covers a few more drug offenders, and expanding it to provide relief to low-level, non-violent offenders subject to mandatory minimums for other offenses; (2) lowering the mandatory sentence for two- and
three-strike drug offenses; (3) lowering the twenty-five-year enhanced penalty for second and subsequent convictions for possession of a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking offense under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and ensuring that they are imposed only for prior convictions; and (4) giving judges
discretion to avoid stacking § 924(c) sentences.191
In what is a sign-of-the-times development in right-left support for criminal justice reform, bipartisan bills have been introduced in the House of Representatives192 and the Senate.193 One such bill, the Justice Safety Valve Act
of 2013, would enable the court to waive the mandatory minimum sentence if
it did not meet the purposes of punishment outlined at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).194
Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont, one of the Senate’s most liberal members
and an ardent opponent of mandatory minimums, teamed up with Senator
Rand Paul of Kentucky, one of the darlings of the Tea Party movement and
also a strong opponent of mandatory sentencing. Together, they are working
to transform sentencing and are the bill’s chief Senate co-sponsors.195
Luna & Cassell, supra note 49, at 54, 80-81.
Justice Safety Valve Act of 2013, H.R. 1695 (2013).
Justice Safety Valve Act of 2013, S. 619 (2013).
See FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, THE PAUL-LEAHY “JUSTICE
SAFETY VALVE ACT OF 2013” S. 619 3 (2013), available at http://famm.org/Repository/Files/Justice%20Safety%20Valve%20Act%20Primer%20S.%20619.pdf.
195. See Patrick Leahy & Rand Paul, Op-Ed, Join Us to Do Away with Mandatory
Minimums, U.S. NEWS, Aug. 15, 2013, available at http://www.usnews.com/debate191.
192.
193.
194.
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In an elegant symmetry, the liberal New York Times Editorial Board
and conservative opinion leader George Will wrote in support of the bill.
While the New York Times noted the bill’s potential to eliminate one-size-fitsall sentencing,196 Will pointed out that “Paul says mandatory minimum
sentences, in the context of the proliferation of federal crimes, undermine
federalism, the separation of powers and ‘the bedrock principle that people
should be treated as individuals.’”197 Both commentaries correctly applaud
the aim of the bill: to ensure that defendants are treated as individuals.
Another bill, S. 1410 the Smarter Sentencing Act of 2013, would reduce
many drug mandatory minimums, slightly expand the current safety valve,
and make lower crack cocaine mandatory minimum sentences retroactive; the
bill was introduced by another bipartisan pair of Senators, Mike Lee (R-UT)
and Richard Durbin (D-IL).198
Congressional reformers gained an important new ally in mid-August
when the Attorney General, Eric Holder, announced new charging policies
designed to help ensure that mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenders would be reserved for violent and kingpin-level offenders.199 The new
policy is intended to change the DOJ’s charging practices so that
certain low-level, nonviolent drug offenders who have no ties to largescale organizations, gangs, or cartels will no longer be charged with
offenses that impose draconian mandatory minimum sentences. They
now will be charged with offenses for which the accompanying sentences are better suited to their individual conduct, rather than excessive prison terms . . . .200

Holder concluded that promoting proportionate sentencing in this fashion
would lead to “better . . . public safety, deterrence, and rehabilitation – while
making our expenditures smarter and more productive.”201 Holder referred
approvingly to the two bipartisan mandatory minimum reform bills then in
club/is-eric-holder-making-a-good-move-on-mandatory-minimums/rand-paul-andpatrick-leahy-congress-is-read-to-do-away-with-mandatory-minimums.
196. Needed: A New Safety Valve, N.Y. TIMES, at A20, June 23, 2013, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/24/opinion/needed-a-new-safety-valve.html?_r=
0&hp=&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1372079871-z+f+tNeJYRdVFHVJUrqRyA.
197. George Will, Seeking Sense on Sentencing, CECILDAILY.COM (June 5, 2013,
4:00 AM) available at http://www.cecildaily.com/opinion/columns/article_864f11eecd82-11e2-9e27-0019bb2963f4.html.
198. Smarter Sentencing Act of 2013, S. 1410, 113th Congress (1st Sess. 2013)
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c113:S.1410:.
199. See Eric Holder, Attorney General Eric Holder Delivers Remarks at the
Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association’s House of Delegates, DEP’T OF
JUSTICE (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2013/ag-speech130812.html.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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play and pledged his support, and that of President Barack Obama, to advancing mandatory minimum reform.202
Shortly after Holder’s speech, the chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee noticed a full committee hearing on the topic of mandatory minimum
sentencing and, in a nod to the reform spirit sweeping conservative and Republican circles, called two Republicans to testify in support of reform.203
Witnesses at the hearing clearly addressed the fiscal impact of sentencing, but
also the human impact of sentences out of proportion to the offenses they
punish. This wedding of practicality and proportionality bodes well for sentencing reform. The Smarter Sentencing Act passed the Senate Judiciary
Committee with bi-partisan support on January 30, 2014.204

IX. CONCLUSION
Federal lawmakers should be, and increasingly appear to be, concerned
about the threat to public safety of federal prison overcrowding, caused in
part by mandatory minimum sentencing. They should also be concerned
about the unfairness of disproportionate sentencing made necessary by mandatory minimums. Taking a page from the ringing endorsement of proportionality embodied in the Supreme Court’s opinion in Miller and Congress’s
provision of individualized sentencing at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and taking
heart from the new bipartisan effort to address mass incarceration and its
costs, Congress should take on the task of reforming mandatory minimum
sentences. It appears more likely than ever that reform is precisely what
many in Congress plan to do.

202. Id.
203. Reevaluating the Effectiveness of Federal Mandatory Minimum Sentences:

Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013), available at
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=d3ddc8eaa9b9f780d5af0a5
54e5fcf98.
204. Smarter Sentencing Act of 2013, S. 1410, 113th Congress (1st Sess. 2013),
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c113:S.1410:.
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